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ABSTRACT
Web applications are an incredibly important aspect of our modern lives. Orga-
nizations and developers use automated vulnerability analysis tools, also known as
scanners, to automatically find vulnerabilities in their web applications during devel-
opment. Scanners have traditionally fallen into two types of approaches: black-box
and white-box. In the black-box approaches the scanner does not have access to the
source code of the web application whereas a white-box approach has access to the
source code. Today’s state-of-the-art black-box vulnerability scanners employ vari-
ous methods to fuzz and detect vulnerabilities in a web application. However, these
scanners attempt to fuzz the web application with a number of known payloads and
to try to trigger a vulnerability. This technique is simple but does not understand
the web application that it is testing. This thesis, presents a new approach to vulner-
ability analysis. The vulnerability analysis module presented uses a novel approach
of Inductive Reverse Engineering (IRE) to understand and model the web applica-
tion. IRE first attempts to understand the behavior of the web application by giving
certain number of input/output pairs to the web application. Then, the IRE module
hypothesizes a set of programs (in a limited language specific to web applications,
called AWL) that satisfy the input/output pairs. These hypotheses takes the form of
a directed acyclic graph (DAG). AWL vulnerability analysis module can then attempt
to detect vulnerabilities in this DAG. Further, it generates the payload based on the
DAG, and therefore this payload will be a precise payload to trigger the potential vul-
nerability (based on our understanding of the program). It then tests this potential
vulnerability using the generated payload on the actual web application, and creates
a verification procedure to see if the potential vulnerability is actually vulnerable,
based on the web application’s response.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Web applications form the most important part of the security ecosystem. Today,
almost every business has web application as their first face to the world. Thus,
security of these web application is of paramount importance. To secure their web
application, most companies hire security professionals (white-hat hackers) to pene-
tration test their web applications to identify vulnerabilities to patch them accord-
ingly. While this process is effective at finding vulnerabilities in web applications, it
is incredibly costly, and, more fundamentally, it does not scale: For instance, these
manual tests cannot be performed every time the code changes, thus leaving a window
for attackers to find and exploit vulnerabilities.
Black-box vulnerability scanners are tools which attempt to automate the pene-
tration testing process. By treating the web application as a black-box (no knowledge
of the source code of the application), these tools automatically discover previously
unknown vulnerabilities. In essence, these tools aim to empower the average developer
with little to no security expertise to discover vulnerabilities in her web application
before an attacker, thus improving the entire security ecosystem.
Our research aims to create a novel black-box vulnerability analysis framework,
called Next Generation Black-Box Vulnerability Analysis Framework, that is able to
find previously unknown vulnerabilities in a web application. We use a recently pro-
posed novel technique called Inductive Reverse Engineering (IRE) [34], which lever-
ages recent advances in program synthesis and inductive programming communities to
reverse engineer a model of the web application’s functionality in a black-box manner.
This model of the web application can be thought of as abstracted source code.
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This thesis work presents a framework to automatically identify potential XSS
vulnerabilities in the abstracted source code using static program analysis techniques.
Once a potential vulnerability is identified in the abstracted source code, we verify the
existence of the vulnerability on the real web application. In this way we are able to
automatically find XSS vulnerability in web applications using IRE.
In summary, this thesis make the following contributions:
• A novel approach of using static program analysis and constraint solving tech-
niques to identify and verify vulnerabilities in Inductive Reverse Engineered
programs (abstracted source code).
• We implement a prototype of next generation black box vulnerability analysis
tool to detect XSS vulnerability in web applications.
• We demo the feasibility of our approach evaluating our prototype on broken
web applications available publicly.
2
Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
This chapter talks about the background of the problem. It describes the novel
concept of Inductive Reverse Engineering, a brief history about Cross-Site Scripting
vulnerability, static program analysis techniques to find this vulnerability in abstracted
source code and constraint solvers.
2.1 Inductive Reverse Engineering
The basic idea of Inductive Programming is simple and was explained in Am-
eral’s original paper on the topic [2]: Given a set of required input/output pairs,
create a program that generates the correct output given the input. This prob-
lem is not as easy as it sounds. Even if you have an if statement that maps each
given input to the output, it does not fulfill the true goal of having a minimal pro-
gram do it. One solution to this is enumerate through all possible programs, in
an order from least complicated to most complicated, and the first program that
solves the input/output constraints is the correct program. This idea of Induc-
tive Programming was further developed in a project started by Gulwani [19, 20]
which became a feature first introduced in Excel 2013 called Flash Fill, which de-
tects when a user is manually performing a data transformation on the previous
columns’ data. Using only a single input/output example, Flash Fill can automat-
ically discover a program that satisfies the input/output example, and then show
this transformation applied to the rest of the data. The user can then choose
to either accept the transformation or enter more input/output examples, so that
the transformation can be refined. This work has been extended to support table
3
lookups [22] and semantic string transformations [53]. In our work, this approach
has been used to Inductively reverse engineer the source code of a web application
using the input/output pairs. This limits the universe of possible programs to learn.
0
1
{'f',input[0][{-3,0}:{-2,1}]}
2
{'fo',input[0][{-3,0}:{2,-1}]}
3
{'foo',input[0][{-3,0}:{0,3}]}{input[0][{-2,1}:{2,-1}],input[0][{2,-1}:{0,3}],'o'}
{input[0][{-2,1}:{0,3}],'oo'}
{input[0][{-2,1}:{2,-1}],input[0][{2,-1}:{0,3}],'o'}
Figure 2.1: Version Space Represented as a Graph for
All Possible Programs that Output "foo" Given the
Input of "foo".
The way these techniques
of Inductive Programming
work is by defining a
domain-specific language
of programs which we de-
scribe in Chapter 4 of this
thesis. Next we use ver-
sion space algebra [42, 33]
to use a data structure to
represent the set of all pos-
sible programs that can
generate a given output from a given input. Further this technique gives us a graph of
each input/output pair. Then we partition the graphs so that they apply to only the
inputs in a given partition and no other partitions. These boolean formulas are also
part of the language, and their expressiveness describes the possible set of boolean
conditions. The final result is a series of boolean conditions and a version space
for each boolean condition that corresponds to the given input/output set. Using
these techniques on web application, from the input/ouput pairs and the boolean
conditions dervied from that we are able to generate an abstracted source code of the
web application which satisfies the input/output pairs and is in our domain-specific
language.
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2.2 Cross Site Scripting
Cross Site Scripting (XSS) is a vulnerability in which an attacker is able control
the JavaScript that her victim executes, in the context of a web application. Specifi-
cally, a XSS vulnerability allows an attacker to circumvent the browser’s Same-Origin
Policy, and an XSS exploit allows an attacker to steal the user’s cookies, phish the
user’s credentials, or perform actions on the web application on behalf of the victim.
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) ranks XSS as the third most
important vulnerability on the web today [47]. Server-side means that the XSS vul-
nerability occurs because of a vulnerability in the server-side code. There are two
types of XSS attackes defined:
1. Reflected XSS — in this type of XSS attack the injected script, by the attacker,
is reflected from the web server, such as in an error message, search results, or
any other response that includes some or all of the user input sent to server as
part of request.
2. Stored XSS — in this type of XSS attack the injected script, by the attacker, is
stored on the server permanently, such as in the database. This injected script
is executed the next time any user navigates to the page.
Ww have targeted to detect reflected XSS vulnerability in web applications using our
AWL Vulnerability Analysis module. To find stored XSS vulnerability we have to
consider the state of the web application to understand the application’s behavior.
This is part of our future work.
2.3 Static Program Analysis
As the name goes, static program analysis analyzes the program without executing
it. These techniques are generally used to find bugs or to analyze a program for syntax
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issues, one example is a compiler. However, there are various other areas where these
techniques can be used efficiently such as finding security vulnerabilities. Leveraging
to the large body of work done on static program analysis techniques [5, 39, 26, 36,
24, 12, 64, 58, 63, 61, 45, 50, 35, 57] we proceed to build our vulnerability analysis
framework. These techniques build a control flow graph of the program which explains
how the program flows through various functions for different inputs. Further, much
research [28, 9, 37] has already been done in using these control flow graphs, to find
vulnerabilities in web applications.
2.4 Constraint Solvers
Constraint solving plays an important role in program analysis for the purpose of
test generation for coverage [51], bug finding [4, 65], and vulnerability detection [9,
30]. The reason for this is solver-based analysis tools enable more precise analysis
with the ability to generate bug-revealing inputs. Z3str2 [66] is a constraint solver
for the quantifier-free theory of string equations, the regular-expression membership
predicates, and linear arithmetic over the length functions. Z3str2 is implemented as
a string theory plug-in of the powerful Z3 SMT solver [13]. Thus, ad-hoc sanitization
routines (which will manifest themselves as either string transformations or boolean
constraints) can be analyzed.
In our work, we are using Z3-str2 [66], to check if XSS exploits can reach a sensitive
output given specific boolean constraints. The constraint solver also helps us to
generate more precise payloads depending upon the substring conditions in the output
for any given input.
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Chapter 3
SYSTEM DESIGN
In this chapter we explain the System Design of our tool. Our tool mainly consists
of three modules.
1. Crawler
2. Inductive Reverse Engineering Module
3. Abstracted Web Language Static Analysis Module
The design of these modules is represented in the Figure 3.1. The Crawler module
crawls the web application with various input-output pairs. The IRE module utilizes
the technique of Inductive Reverse Engineering to generate the abstracted source code
of the web application. The AWL module further uses this abstracted web language
program generated from the IRE module [34] to perform vulnerability analysis.
3.1 System Architecture
This section discusses the architecture of the Abstracted Web Language(AWL)
vulnerability analysis module of the Black-Box tool. The AWL vulnerability analy-
sis module is the second major part of the Next Generation Automated Black-Box
Vulnerability Analysis Framework after the IRE module. This module is responsible
to find vulnerabilities in the abstracted source code of web application generated by
the IRE module. The vulnerability analysis architecture Figure 3.2 shows various
modules responsible for vulnerability identification in the reverse engineered source
code.
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Figure 3.1: System Design
3.2 System Components
This section explains each system component of the prototype’s system architec-
ture.
3.2.1 IRE Module
The IRE module is the one which has the logic for reverse engineering the source
code of web application. The logic of the IRE module is based on the concept of
Inductive Programming, where you try to generate all possible programs for a given
input/output pair. This module works by fuzzing the web application with input/out-
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Figure 3.2: System architecture
put pairs and try to generate all possible programs that can represent that particular
application. These input/output pairs are stored in the form of directed acyclic
graph’s by the IRE module. As part of the fuzzer the input strings are randomly gen-
erated of small letters[a-z], capital letters[A-Z], Digits[0-9] and special characters.
The fuzzer in the IRE module plays an important role because, the more number
of string variants we use, the more we can learn about the application and reverse
engineer its functionality.
3.2.2 Check Vulnerability
This module takes the directed acyclic graph’s generated by the IRE module as
input and finds vulnerability over the same. Our algorithm 1 traverses over all the
DAG’s generated by the IRE module. This module flags any theory as vulnerable if it
is of the type Sub String of the input given by the user. It does not flag theories which
contains constant string in it. This is because we believe that the output generated
by the inputs does not vary in the HTML or CSS content of the response.
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Algorithm 1 Check vulnerable
function check_vulnerable(b, η˜, ηs, ηt )
while ηs 6= ηt do
if theory == ConstStr() : then return False
if theory == SubStr() : then
vuln_theory = theory
end_indicies = theory.indicies
payload = generate_payload(b, end_indices)
if payload == None then return False
if payload 6= None then
bˆ = PoC_generator(payload)
PoC_validator(b,bˆ)
The input to our vulnerability module is the Abstracted Web Language synthe-
sized code generated by the IRE module. This input is the DAG we refer to in Figure
7.2. Because we have to find vulnerabilities over these dags, we take these DAGs one
at a time as input to our algorithm. Now, we traverse over this graph completely
to check if there are any theories along the edges which might be vulnerable. If the
user is entering any input and that input is somehow reflected in any HTML input
tag in the response then we call it as substring theory. Now, to make our scanner
to find as many vulnerabilities as it can we assume each SubStr theory as vulnerable
and try to generate XSS payload for any such theory. The next step in our algorithm
is to find if there is an PHP SubStr manipulation done on the server side of user
input. This means, we are trying to see if the server is chopping of the user input and
then displaying it or adding some random characters in the start. These cases are
correctly captured by our IRE module and presented on the edges of the DAG. All
10
Algorithm 2 Payload Generation
function generate_payload(B, end_indices)
if end_indices == None then
z3_solver(B,None)
if end_indices < 0 then
string = gen_z3Constraint(end_indices)
z3_solver(B, string)
if end_indices > 0 then
string = gen_z3Constraint(end_indices)
z3_solver(B, string)
function gen_z3Constraint(end_indices)
generate z3_constraint according to value of end_indices
return newConstraint
function z3_solver(z3_string, newConstraint)
solve(z3_string, newConstraint)
if SAT then
return Precise Payload String
if UNSAT then
return Payload cannot be generated
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Algorithm 3 Proof-of-Concept generator
function PoC_generator(payload)
Fuzz the application with the payload to generate DAG return bˆ
function PoC_validator(b,bˆ)
dag3 = b.intersect(bˆ)
if dag3 == None then return Cannot generate PoC.
if dag3 6= None then return Vulnerable. PoC generated.
these DAG’s we know are partitioned using boolean classifiers which we mentioned
earlier. We use these boolean classifiers to generate Z3 constraints. In other words,
we convert these boolean classifier into various strings which can be given as input to
Z3 Constraint Solver. Z3 is a very powerful SMT solver which can solve constraints
and also generate strings which Satisfy those constraints. Our XSS payload which
satisfies all the boolean classifiers is generated by Z3. This payload generated by Z3
will be precise according to the boolean constraints. Hence we are sure at this point of
algorithm that this payload will satisfy all the required input conditions, that the IRE
module inferred from, of the web application. Now we again fuzz the web application
to generate input/output pairs for input payload. These steps are done in order to
generate proof-of-concept that the precise payload given by Z3 will actually trigger a
XSS vulnerability in the web application. The poc_generator function fuzzes the web
application with input as payload and generated the required DAG. The poc_checker
function will now take the complete DAG learnt by the IRE module and the DAG
generate by poc_generator function and will try to intersect them. If an intersection
is found then we check if the same theory is present on the intersected DAG as we
observed in the vulnerable DAG. If that is the case then our scanner outputs that the
XSS payload will definitely trigger vulnerability in the web application.
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3.2.3 Boolean Constraints
The IRE module in our prototype generates the abstracted source code on the
basis of the domain specific language designed by the IRE module. IRE module
uses various boolean classifiers in order to reverse engineer the source code. These
boolean classifiers are dependent on our language and currently consists of various
regular expressions defined in our language. The AWL vulnerability analysis module
further uses these boolean classifier to generate Z3-constraints.
3.2.4 Constraint Solver
The idea behind using Z3-str2 constraint solver is to generate a precise payload
that can satisfy as input to the web application. Using the IRE module we already
know the behavior of the web application. This behavior reflects exactly if the web
application is reflecting the same input string to the user as is, performing any sub-
string operation like chopping of certain number of characters at the start of user
input or chopping of certain number of characters at the end of user input. Due to
this behavior it is very important to generate precise payload which will get executed
as reflected XSS payload on the web browser. Even a single character mismatch, for
instance ’t>’ of the XSS payload ’<script>alert(’XSS’)</script>’, gets chopped off
by the server side logic then our payload may not get executed and would flag as not
vulnerable. Therefore, in this case we use Z3 to solve this constraint too for us. It
generates precise string of the required length which will satisfy all these constraints.
This example, explains very clearly why we make use of Z3 constraint solver in our
tool. Algorithm 2 describes how we convert the boolean constraints into Z3-str2
constraints.
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3.2.5 PoC & Payload Generator
The payload generator module generates various XSS payload strings which are
to be tested with the constraint solver. These XSS payloads are taken from the
OWASP XSS cheat sheet [48]. The algorithm to generate the payload is described in
Algorithm 2. Section 10 of this thesis document explains how this payload generation
module can be extended to fuzz of all different types of XSS payload out there in the
wild. The PoC generator module generates a proof-of-concept which is satisfying the
constraints and is actually triggering the XSS vulnerability in the application and also
test the payload against the web application to see if it is actually vulnerable. This
module again uses the IRE module to generate the graph of input output pairs for the
web application while the difference is this time it uses XSS payload string as input.
Further, this module confirms the vulnerability by intersecting the generated graph
with the previously generated graph from random input/output pairs. According
to our theories if this intersection happens, then the XSS payload should trigger the
vulnerability in the application. If we can see the same string in both the graph being
reflected we can be sure that the web application is vulnerable and the payload used
can trigger the vulnerability. The PoC checker checks if the same string is present
as the longest string on the intersected graph as well as the graph generated during
initial crawling. The Algorithm 3 describes the way we generate proof-of-concept for
the precise payload generated.
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Chapter 4
ABSTRACTED WEB LANGUAGE
This chapter introduces you to the Abstracted web language. The goal of AWL is to
be a domain-specific language for web applications. This is the most important part
of our research. Our input-output analysis depends on this language. The assertion
we claim that, using the input-output pairs we can generate all possible programs
which can generate you the same input-output pairs, depends on this language. The
more expressive we make our language the more behavior we would learn of the web
application. The concept, syntax and semantics of AWL was inherited from IRE
module developed by Liao [34].
4.1 Syntax of Language for describing AWL Programs
In this section we explain the syntax of abstracted web language. This language is
defined by us in order to understand the behavior of the web application. According
to the syntax of AWL language we can represent all the programs which can generate
the input-output pair. These programs can be represented as a big switch statement
of programs to generate the given input-output pair. We represent all the boolean
conditions by b1 and x˜1, ... x˜n represents all the directed acyclic graphs generate for
given input-output pair. These together represent a big set of synthesized programs
in AWL. Now, the DAG is a concatenation of all the html output. Thus output
can further described as made up of HTML start tag concatenated with HTML data
concatenated with HTML end tag and HTML self-closing tags. We also represent
HTML attributes by in our syntax of AWL language. Each DAG is made up of nodes,
start node, end node, edges and W, the web application itself which takes in the path,
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method, and query parameters. These atomic expression are the main language we
have defined. It consists of
• SubStr of input and position of strings
• ConstStr which represent string which is constant for all the given inputs
• TwoInputMath which perform Math operations on given input
• ConstMath which performs Math operations on given input and a constant
4.2 Semantics of Language for describing sets of AWL Programs
In this section we describe the semantics of our AWL language for describing sets
of AWL programs. We explain them as below:
T represents all the HTML token in the output we get for the given input. Data
is the HTML data which is inside the generic HTML tags. For example a <form>
tag with input type and value. EndTag are the ending tags in every HTML, for
instance />. In the recent developments in HTML5, we observe self-closing tags. For
instance in the closing tag />, the / is completely optional in HTML5. Hence in our
language semantics we consider that too. (A˜1, e˜1) represent the HTML attributes.
For example, this set would contain all the attributes in a form tag.
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Chapter 5
IMPLEMENTATION
In this chapter we explain how we implemented the prototype in Python programming
language. To implement the scanner we had a system setup as follows:
5.1 System Configuration
We used one machine to implement the tool. The details about this machine are
as follows:
• MacBook Pro
CPU: Intel Core i7 @ 3.1GHz
Cache Size: 4M
No. of Cores: 2
Total Memory: 8GB
Disk Space: 256GB
5.2 Platforms and Software
Our scanner is built to run on any machine which has Python and certain packages
installed on it. To perform the experiments we ran our scanner on test-applications
as well as published vulnerable applications. These applications were hosted on our
own machine to complete the experiments. The platforms and softwares used to build
this tool are enumerated in Table 5.1:
17
Operating system macOS Sierra
Web Server Apache - 2.4.23
Constraint-Solver Z3-str2
Table 5.1: Platforms and software used for our tool.
5.3 Languages
We used Python 2 to build the system. The reasons for choosing this language
are: it has numerous libraries for fuzzing an application and it is easy to use the
data structures in this language. The major libraries which were used for our tool
are listed in Table 5.2:
Library Functionality
Requests HTTP Request Generation
Beautiful Soup HTML Parsing
Subprocess Spawn new process
Table 5.2: Libraries that we used and their functions.
5.4 OWASP Broken Application
In order to test our scanner we had to find some publicly available web applications
which are designed to be vulnerable. The best resource to find such applications is
the OWASP website. There are certain limitations to our vulnerability scanner which
are discussed in the section8.3. Considering those we reversed engineered the web ap-
plications to serve our needs viz., stateless web application. Table 5.3 enumerates the
web applications we used in order to test our tool. We choose these web applications
because they are released as broken web application on OWASP web site [47]. This
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Sr No Web Application Source URL
1 test-vul https://github.com/tejas619/tejas-test-vul
2 WackoPicko https://github.com/adamdoupe/WackoPicko
3 xvwa https://github.com/s4n7h0/xvwa
4 btslab https://github.com/CSPF-Founder/btslab
Table 5.3: Web applications used for our experiments
helps us in proving our results because the payload used to exploit these websites are
also released by the authors of these broken web application.
5.5 Problems Faced
This section describes some issues we faced while implementing the design and
idea of our tool.
• Support of Regular expressions in Z3
After going through the documentation of Z3-SMT solver, we found that it
would support only limited use of regular expressions in constraint solving. We
were not able to generate regular expression defined in our language using Z3.
Hence, we decided to look for any supporting library built on top of Z3 which
would help us defining and solving regular expressions in our language. After a
good amount of research we found that there is certain amount work done over
supporting regular expressions in constraint solving. Amongst the related tools
were
– Hampi [30] - solver for string constraints
– STP [17] - constraint solver for theory of quantifier-free-bit-vectors
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– Z3-str2 [66] - constraint solver for the quantifier-free theory of string equa-
tions, the regular-expression membership predicates, and linear arithmetic
over the length functions
Looking at our requirements and the work done in above tools, we decided to
use Z3-str2.
• Detect False Positives
Automated vulnerability analysis tool are a creation of a human who has knowl-
edge of penetration testing a web application. Hence these tools can be intel-
ligent only to a certain extent due to which often times they generate false
positives. In our case we had to find a way in which we can detect false posi-
tives given by our tool. Hence we decided to implement the PoC checker module
which actually checks if the XSS payload give by payload generator triggers the
vulnerability in the web application.
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Chapter 6
EVALUATION
This chapter describes our evaluation of the system, with the experiments conducted,
results and screen captures of the output of our scanner.
6.1 Results
This section discusses our results after running our scanner on various test appli-
cations mentioned in the Section 5.4.
6.2 Experiments on Vulnerable application
We conducted our experiments on the latest versions of 3 open source PHP vulner-
able applications: xvwa, btslab and wackopicko. Table 6.1 summarizes our findings
for these 3 applications. The table shows that we were successfully able to generate
precise payload, generate proof of concept and flag the application vulnerable to re-
flected XSS attack. We further explain our results for WackoPicko application, for
which our application was not able to generate results, in the Section 7.
Sr No Web Application Precise Payload Proof of Concept Vulnerable
1 test-vul X X X
2 WackoPicko × × ×
3 xvwa X X X
4 btslab X X X
Table 6.1: Experiment results
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6.3 Implementation Output Results
These are some of the screenshots showing how our scanner asks the user for web
application URL as input to scan, perform fuzzing operation and output results to the
user. Figure 6.1 shows how our scanner accepts the URL of the web application to be
scanned as input parameter. Once given in the right format the Crawler component
of the tool fetches the parameters on the page and gives you a list of query parameters
which it is going to fuzz for outputs.
Figure 6.1: Screen Capture of our Tool in action - 1
Figure 6.2 shows the boolean classifiers generated by the IRE module for the
given web application. This screenshot output is for the test-vul application we
describe about in the running example chapter. In the Figure we can also see Z3-str3
constraints generated for the boolean classifier. These are further fed to Z3-str2 which
generates the precise payload.
First line of Figure 6.3 tells you how the AWLSA module confirms using constraint
solver that the payload generated satisfies the boolean constraints. Further, we can
see our AWLSA module again fuzzes the web application with payload as input and
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Figure 6.2: Screen Capture of our Tool in action - 2
generates required input-output pairs. Then it moves to the Proof of concept logic
and outputs whether proof of concept was successfully generated or not.
Figure 6.3: Screen Capture of our Tool in action - 3
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Chapter 7
CASE STUDY
In this section we describe a case study of our scanner over our test application. To
explain the functioning in depth we have to first dive into the test application which
we have built. We call this test application as test-vul.
7.1 Test Application
Our test application is built in PHP and is one of the most simplest web applica-
tions. This application is a stateless application, which means it does not maintain
any kind of user state in it. It just asks the user for input and prints the input as
output in the HTML page.
In the Listing 7.1 we can see that this simple web application only echo’s the
input of the user as a substring stripping of the last two characters from the end. The
application checks whether the second text box is not empty. So if the user submits
the form with random strings in both the input text boxes, the page-2 of the web
application will be the response from the application.
7.2 IRE Module
The IRE module when ran on this web application will fuzz both the user inputs
with strings which fall in our abstracted web language. This gives the IRE module an
idea about how to generate the synthesized PHP code using the input/output pairs.
Considering our language in mind our fuzzer generates the following strings at the
input text boxes:
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1 <html>
2 <head>
3 <t i t l e >Login page</ t i t l e >
4 </head>
5 <body>
6 <h1>Simple Login Page</h1>
7 <form act i on="page2 . php" method="POST">
8 Username<input type=" text " name=" us e r i d ">
9 Password<input type="password" name="password">
10 <input type="submit" value="Login">
11 </form>
12 </body>
13 </html>
Listing 7.1: Example Simple PHP Web Application - Page 1
1 <html>
2 <body>
3 <?php
4 i f ( ! empty ($_POST[ "password" ] ) ) {
5 $ r e s = subs t r ($_POST[ ' us e r i d ' ] , 0 , −2) ;
6 echo 'Welcome ' . $ r e s . "<br>" ;
7 echo 'This i s your Welcome page ! ' ;
8 } e l s e {
9 echo ' Sorry 404 not found ' ;
10 }
11 ?>
12 </body>
13 </html>
Listing 7.2: Example Simple PHP Web Application - Page 2
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1 "$ \ '@!" , "/(](−\& `) \"=" , "−^(\&", " lunch " , " concede " , " automobi les " , "
exu l ted " , "Afghanistan "
The IRE module then stores all the input/output pairs in the form of a Directed
Acyclic Graph, we call it a DAG. The structure of this DAG is similar to a normal
graph with nodes and edges. The edges in these DAG’s are our theories which we
define in our language. These theories are:
• ConstStr - Strings like plain HTML, CSS which are generic to every server
response.
• SubStr - Substring of the user input which can be represented in different ways
and change according to the applications code.
• TwoInputMath - output is the result of a math operation on two inputs.
• ConstMath - output is the result of math operation with an input and a con-
stant.
Now, our IRE module classifies the input-output pairs based on various boolean con-
straints defined in our language. These boolean constraints are part of our language
which decides whether particular input/output pair should fall into which category.
For instance, we have a boolean constraint "/ˆ[a-zA-Z0-9]+$/ = input[0]" which states
that the input[0] entered by the fuzzer matches the regular expression which captures
all letters and digits. This tells the IRE module to generate separate DAG’s for each
boolean classifier accordingly. The boolean constraints generated according to our
language of the test-vul application are shown in Figure 7.1. These boolean classi-
fiers are a set of Or boolean conditions.
26
Or
And
NotMatch
And
NullMatch
And
NotMatch
And
NullMatch
Figure 7.1: Boolean Constraints
For the sample PHP application the complete DAG’s generated by the IRE module
can be represented as in Figure 7.2.
7.3 Result of Vulnerability Analysis
Here we show how exactly the intersected graph generated by the poc_checker
module exactly looks like. This graph is the intersection of all the edges in the
complete version space graph generated by the IRE module and the version space
graph generated by the vulnerability module with XSS payload as input. We can see
that there is an edge present with the same theory on the intersected graph as there
is on the complete version space graph. This proves our theory of graph intersection
and also creates a proof of concept about the payload we used to attack on the web
application.
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IF input[1] is null
0
1
<html>
    <head>
        <title>Login page</title>
    </head>
    <body>
        <h1>Simple Login Page</h1>
        <form action="page2.php" method="POST">
            Username<input type="text" name="userid">
            Password<input type="password" name="password">
            <input type="submit" value="Login">
        </form>
    </body>
</html>
IF !(input[1] is null)
0
1
<html>
<body>
Welcome 
2
input[1][:1]
3
input[1][:-3]
4
input[1][:-2]
input[1][1:-2] input[1][-3:-2]
5
<br>This is your Welcome page!</body>
</html>
Figure 7.2: Version Space Graphs for Sample PHP Application 7.1.
IF True
(((((((0, 0), (0, 0)), ((0, 0), (0, 0))), (((0, 0), (0, 0)), ((0, 0), (0, 0)))), ((((0, 0), (0, 0)), ((0, 0), (0, 0))), (((0, 0), (0, 0)), ((0, 0), (0, 0))))), (((((0, 0), (0, 0)), ((0, 0), (0, 0))), (((0, 0), (0, 0)), ((0, 0), (0, 0)))), ((((0, 0), (0, 0)), ((0, 0), (0, 0))), (((0, 0), (0, 0)), ((0, 0), (0, 0)))))), 0)
(((((((76, 71), (70, 76)), ((77, 71), (73, 70))), (((77, 73), (76, 77)), ((77, 70), (70, 77)))), ((((70, 73), (76, 77)), ((77, 70), (71, 77))), (((73, 76), (70, 70)), ((77, 73), (77, 73))))), (((((70, 76), (71, 70)), ((71, 73), (71, 70))), (((70, 70), (77, 77)), ((77, 73), (73, 70)))), ((((70, 71), (77, 76)), ((71, 73), (70, 73))), (((73, 73), (73, 76)), ((73, 77), (77, 73)))))), 96)
(((((((22, 22), (22, 22)), ((22, 22), (22, 22))), (((22, 22), (22, 22)), ((22, 22), (22, 22)))), ((((22, 22), (22, 22)), ((22, 22), (22, 22))), (((22, 22), (22, 22)), ((22, 22), (22, 22))))), (((((22, 22), (22, 22)), ((22, 22), (22, 22))), (((22, 22), (22, 22)), ((22, 22), (22, 22)))), ((((22, 22), (22, 22)), ((22, 22), (22, 22))), (((22, 22), (22, 22)), ((22, 22), (22, 22)))))), 22)
<html>
<body>
Welcome 
(((((((29, 24), (23, 29)), ((30, 24), (26, 23))), (((30, 26), (29, 30)), ((30, 23), (23, 30)))), ((((23, 26), (29, 30)), ((30, 23), (24, 30))), (((26, 29), (23, 23)), ((30, 26), (30, 26))))), (((((23, 29), (24, 23)), ((24, 26), (24, 23))), (((23, 23), (30, 30)), ((30, 26), (26, 23)))), ((((23, 24), (30, 29)), ((24, 26), (23, 26))), (((26, 26), (26, 29)), ((26, 30), (30, 26)))))), 49)
(((((((30, 25), (24, 30)), ((31, 25), (27, 24))), (((31, 27), (30, 31)), ((31, 24), (24, 31)))), ((((24, 27), (30, 31)), ((31, 24), (25, 31))), (((27, 30), (24, 24)), ((31, 27), (31, 27))))), (((((24, 30), (25, 24)), ((25, 27), (25, 24))), (((24, 24), (31, 31)), ((31, 27), (27, 24)))), ((((24, 25), (31, 30)), ((25, 27), (24, 27))), (((27, 27), (27, 30)), ((27, 31), (31, 27)))))), 50)
input[1][-3:-2]
input[1][:-3]
input[1][:-2] (((((((23, 23), (23, 23)), ((23, 23), (23, 23))), (((23, 23), (23, 23)), ((23, 23), (23, 23)))), ((((23, 23), (23, 23)), ((23, 23), (23, 23))), (((23, 23), (23, 23)), ((23, 23), (23, 23))))), (((((23, 23), (23, 23)), ((23, 23), (23, 23))), (((23, 23), (23, 23)), ((23, 23), (23, 23)))), ((((23, 23), (23, 23)), ((23, 23), (23, 23))), (((23, 23), (23, 23)), ((23, 23), (23, 23)))))), 23)
input[1][:1]
<br>This is your Welcome page!</body>
</html>
input[1][1:-2]
Figure 7.3: Version Space Graphs for Sample PHP Application Generated by
AWLSA module.
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Chapter 8
DISCUSSION
In this section we dig into the results of the scanner and discuss how these results
were obtained and what are the certain limitations of our scanner.
8.1 Lessons Learned
Our results show that we can definitely scale Inductive Reverse Engineering tech-
nique for reversing source code of web applications. The more we extend our AWL
language, the more we learn about the web applications. Static program analysis
technique has been already been used in the security community for vulnerability
analysis. Using this already proven technique we moved ahead with fusing this with
lesser used constraint solving technique.
This was an implementation challenge for us because using constraint solvers to gen-
erate precise payloads required us to convert our boolean constraints into constraints
which Z3-str2 will understand. Hence we converted all the boolean constraints gen-
erated by IRE module into Z3-str2 constraints and then solved them.
Z3 constraint solver does not support for regular expression and hence finding work
done above Z3 which supports regular expressions was also a lesson learned. There
were several other similar SMT solvers, but we chose Z3-str2 because of its efficiency.
8.2 Vulnerable Applications
test-vul is a stateless web application is created for testing purposes. This appli-
cation is a simple PHP login form with two input boxes and a submit button. The
source code of this PHP application on the server side does not have any kind of
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input sanitization routines in place. The application simply ’echo’s’ the user input
with some static HTML content. Because this application did not contain any kind
of input sanitization or any kind of string matching checks at the server side, it was
very easy for our scanner to generate the synthesized PHP code and fuzz the input
with the right XSS payload.
WackoPicko [16] is a website developed by Dr. Adam Doupe that contains known
vulnerabilities. Our scanner being in prototype mode for IRE technique, only works
on stateless applications. Hence we run our scanner only on the page in WackoPicko
which is vulnerable to reflected XSS. This page contains only one search box, where
user can search for pictures uploaded by other users of the application. This search
box has no input sanitization and uses the query parameter directly to search for
the input string. However, this application uses HTML encoding techniques, and
performs HTML encoding for the & character. It converts this character into its
HTML encoded form,which is &amp;. Our scanner fails this case becuase we fuzz
the inputs with special character regular expression which contains & in it. Hence
when the application generates the output for these inputs, our IRE theory treats the
‘amp;‘ after the & as a constant string and creates new edges in the directed acyclic
graph for the application. Due to this we are still not able to understand the web
application completely. But, we intend to modify our scanner to an extent where it
will be having HTML encoding as inputs to the fuzzer.
xvwa is a badly coded web application in PHP/MySQL and is listed on the
OWASP broken web application list. The page in this application is vulnerable to
reflected XSS contains a form with submit button which asks user to enter a message.
The code on the server side uses the GET method to receive the message. Our scanner
fuzzes this vulnerable parameter with precise XSS payload and performs the PoC
generation too.
30
btslab is another badly coded web applicaton listed on OWASP broken applica-
tion list. This application is vulnerable to various vulnerabilities starting from SQL
injection to file upload vulnerability. This application has a lot of HTML content
and many hyperlinks. Due to this fact our IRE module takes a little bit longer to
generate all the possible DAG’s and perform intersection of them. Again our vulner-
ability finder module, fuzzes the search parameter with XSS payload and generates
DAG’s for that input/output pair. Even though our approaches do not scale to a good
amount for this application, we were able to detect this application as vulnerable.
8.3 Limitations
Our IRE module was able to scale the inductive programming techinques to real
web applications, the type of web application we are able to reverse engineer and size
of the applications are the areas for improvement. Our scanner right now only works
on stateless web application. In our theories we plan to consider state of the web
application too. Once, we consider the state then the vulnerability module can be
extended to find vulnerabilities like SQL Injection and stored XSS. Our IRE module
fuzzes the web application in order to learn its behaviors with certain number of
randomly generated strings. The more we increase this number the more we can
learn about the behaviour of the web application. Finding a technique which will
fuzz the web application with minimum number of inputs and learning most of it is
another direction for research.
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Chapter 9
RELATED WORK
Number of previous efforts in the area of static program analysis focus on finding
vulnerabilities in PHP, JAVA applications, including tools such as Pixy [28], NoTam-
per [9], WAPTECH [10]. Pixy [28] employed static analysis with taint propagation
to identify SQL injection and XSS vulnerabilities. Saner [6] also uses static analysis
techniques to detect flaws in the input sanitization routines. WebSSARI [25] also
utilizes static analysis techniques for detecting SQL injection vulnerabilities but it
also proposes a techniques to insert proper input sanitization routine during runtime.
These tools constructively use static program analysis to analyze program flows and
find sink points where the vulnerability lie. These techniques can be further extended
to find vulnerabilities over abstracted web language programs. The concept of gen-
erating abstracted web language program using the technique of Inductive Reverse
Engineering is very novel and hence till now no work is done on the same. Even
though, there are some approaches [14] that perform static analysis on the code to
create UML diagrams of the application. Bisht et al. [9], propose an approach for au-
tomatically finding parameter tampering vulnerabilities using the idea of constraint
solving. This approach automatically identifies various constraints on the server side
for a web application and solve these constraints to trigger parameter tampering vul-
nerability. They use HAMPI [30], a solver for string constraints in order to solve
the boolean constraints their tool generate. Our work uses a combination of these
two profound techniques, static program analysis and constraint solving, in order to
find vulnerabilities in abstracted web language programs. Also, there are numerous
tools which target on finding XSS vulnerability in web application. There are mainly
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tow approaches in order to do so. One is the Black-Box approach and other is the
White-Box approach. Various tools like Enemy of the state [15], Secubat [29] describe
their black-box approach in order to understand the state of the web application and
finding vulnerabilities in the web application. Enemy of the state [15], infers the state
of the web application from the outside, by observing differences in the output and
generating state of the web application using the same. Our tool currently is not
considering the state of the web application and hence this research can help us in
inculcating the state in our tool. To our knowledge, no other research has been con-
ducted in finding vulnerabilities over abstracted web language programs. Combining
our study from above research we present a novel approach built on the baseline of
static program analysis and constraint solving to automatically find XSS vulnerability
over this AWL programs.
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Chapter 10
FUTURE WORK
Our work is currently very precise and scales over only stateless web applications built
in PHP language. In the future we plan to consider the state of the web application
as an input in our IRE module. This will enable us to understand when the web
application changes its behavior according to the input-output pairs summited to
it. Once we have the state as one of our theories, we can extend our vulnerability
analysis module to finding SQL injection vulnerabilities in web applications. The
constraint solving technique is also widely used previously by researchers in order to
detect parameter tampering attacks. Our scanner will also be able to cover those
vulnerabilities once the milestone of considering state is achieved. Because we are
working on this novel approach of Reverse Engineering the source code of the web
application, there are many paths we can take in the future to refine our scanner.
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Chapter 11
CONCLUSION
In this thesis we present a technique to perform vulnerability analysis over abstracted
web language programs which are generated by a novel approach of Inductive Reverse
Engineering. We show that how we can successfully find vulnerabilities over these
programs and make our vulnerability scanner more intelligent and precise as compared
to other Black-Box vulnerability scanner which fuzz the web application without
knowing the server side code. We believe our approach of fusing static program
analysis and constraint solving to detect vulnerabilities in abstracted web language
programs is valid. Further, these techniques can be adopted by other black-box
scanners to generate precise payloads.
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